Time of perestroika of the USSR. Perestroika in the USSR. In the economic sphere

In March 1985, M.S. became the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Gorbachev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR - N.I. Ryzhkov. The transformation of Soviet society began, which was to be carried out within the framework of the socialist system.

In April 1985, at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, a course was proclaimed to accelerate the socio-economic development of the country (policy " acceleration"). Its levers were to be the technological re-equipment of production and increasing labor productivity. It was supposed to increase productivity through labor enthusiasm (socialist competitions were revived), the eradication of alcoholism (anti-alcohol campaign - May 1985) and the fight against unearned income.

“Acceleration” led to some economic recovery, but by 1987 a general decline in production began in agriculture, and then in industry. The situation was complicated by the huge capital investments required to eliminate the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (April 1986) and the ongoing war in Afghanistan.

The country's leadership was forced to make more radical changes. Since summer 1987 perestroika proper begins. The program of economic reforms was developed by L. Abalkin, T. Zaslavskaya, P. Bunich. The NEP became the model for perestroika.

The main content of perestroika:
In the economic sphere:

State-owned enterprises are being transferred to self-financing and self-sufficiency. Since defense enterprises were unable to operate in the new conditions, a conversion is being carried out - transferring production to a peaceful basis (demilitarization of the economy).
In rural areas, the equality of five forms of management was recognized: state farms, collective farms, agricultural complexes, rental collectives and private farms.
To control product quality, state acceptance was introduced. The directive state plan was replaced by state orders.

In the political sphere:

Internal party democracy is expanding. Internal party opposition arises, associated primarily with the failures of economic reforms. At the October (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, B.N., criticized the indecisiveness in pursuing the policy of reforms and methods of change. Yeltsin. At the XIX All-Union Conference of the CPSU, a decision was made to ban uncontested elections.
The state apparatus is being significantly restructured. In accordance with the decisions of the XIX Conference (June 1988), a new supreme body of legislative power is established - the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and the corresponding republican congresses. Permanent Supreme Soviets of the USSR and republics were formed from among the people's deputies. The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR became the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev (March 1989), Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR - B.N. Yeltsin (May 1990). In March 1990, the post of president was introduced in the USSR. The first president of the USSR was M.S. Gorbachev.
Since 1986, the policy “ publicity" And " pluralism", i.e. in the USSR, a kind of freedom of speech is artificially created, presupposing the possibility of free discussion of a range of issues strictly defined by the party.
A multi-party system is beginning to take shape in the country.

In the spiritual realm:

The state weakens ideological control over the spiritual sphere of society. Previously prohibited literary works known to readers only from “samizdat” - “The Gulag Archipelago” by A. Solzhenitsyn, “Children of the Arbat” by B. Rybakov, etc. – are freely published.
Within the framework of “glasnost” and “pluralism,” round tables are held on certain issues in the history of the USSR. Criticism of Stalin’s “cult of personality” begins, attitudes towards the Civil War are revised, etc.
Cultural ties with the West are expanding.

By 1990, the idea of perestroika had practically exhausted itself. It was not possible to stop the decline in production. Attempts to develop private initiative—the movements of farmers and cooperators—resulted in the flourishing of the “black market” and deepening shortages. “Glasnost” and “pluralism” - the main slogans of perestroika - lead to a decline in the authority of the CPSU and the development of nationalist movements. However, since the spring of 1990, the Gorbachev administration has been moving to the next stage of political and economic transformation. G. Yavlinsky and S. Shatalin prepared the “5oo days” program, which provided for relatively radical economic transformations with the goal of a gradual transition to the market. This program was rejected by Gorbachev under the influence of the conservative wing of the CPSU.

In June 1990, a resolution was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on a gradual transition to a regulated market economy. Gradual demonopolization, decentralization and denationalization of property, the establishment of joint stock companies and banks, and the development of private entrepreneurship were envisaged. However, these measures could no longer save the socialist system and the USSR.

Already in the mid-80s, the collapse of the state was actually planned. Powerful nationalist movements emerge. In 1986, pogroms of the Russian population took place in Kazakhstan. Interethnic conflicts arose in Fergana (1989), in the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan (1990). Since 1988, the armed Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict began in Nagorno-Karabakh. In 1988-1989 Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, and Moldova are leaving the control of the center. In 1990 they officially proclaimed their independence.

June 12, 1990 The 1st Congress of Soviets of the RSFSR accepts Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Russian Federation.

The President of the USSR enters into direct negotiations with the leadership of the republics on concluding a new Union Treaty. To give legitimacy to this process, in March 1991, an all-Union referendum was held on the issue of preserving the USSR. The majority of the population spoke in favor of preserving the USSR, but under new conditions. In April 1991, negotiations between Gorbachev and the leadership of 9 republics began in Novo-Ogarevo (“Novo-Ogarevo process”).

By August 1991, it was possible to prepare a compromise draft of the Union Treaty, according to which the republics received significantly greater independence. The signing of the agreement was scheduled for August 22.

It was the planned signing of the Union Treaty that provoked the speech State Emergency Committee (August 19–August 21, 1991 d), who tried to preserve the USSR in its old form. The State Committee for a State of Emergency in the Country (GKChP) included Vice-President of the USSR G.I. Yanaev, Prime Minister V.S. Pavlov, Minister of Defense D.T. Yazov, Minister of Internal Affairs B.K. Pugo, KGB Chairman V.A. Kryuchkov.

The State Emergency Committee issued an order for the arrest of B.N. Yeltsin, elected on June 12, 1991, President of the RSFSR. Martial law was introduced. However, the majority of the population and military personnel refused to support the State Emergency Committee. This sealed his defeat. On August 22, the members were arrested, but the signing of the agreement never took place.

As a result of the August putsch, the authority of M.S. was completely undermined. Gorbachev. Real power in the country passed to the leaders of the republics. At the end of August, the activities of the CPSU were suspended. December 8, 1991 The leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (B.N. Yeltsin, L.M. Kravchuk, S.S. Shushkevich) announced the dissolution of the USSR and the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) - “ Bialowieza Accords" On December 21, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan joined the CIS. December 25 M.S. Gorbachev resigned from the post of President of the USSR.

Foreign policy of the USSR In 1985-1991

Having come to power, the Gorbachev administration confirmed the traditional priorities of the USSR in the field of international relations. But already at the turn of 1987-1988. fundamental adjustments are made to them in the spirit of “ new political thinking».

The main content of the “new political thinking”:

Recognition of the modern world as unified and interdependent, i.e. rejection of the thesis about the split of the world into two opposing ideological systems.
Recognition as a universal way to resolve international issues is not the balance of power of the two systems, but the balance of their interests.
Rejection of the principle of proletarian internationalism and recognition of the priority of universal human values.

The new foreign policy course required new personnel - the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a symbol of successful Soviet foreign policy, A.A. Gromyko was replaced by E.A. Shevardnadze.

Based on the principles of “new thinking,” Gorbachev determined three main directions of foreign policy:

Reducing tensions between East and West through disarmament negotiations with the United States.
Resolution of regional conflicts (starting with Afghanistan).
Expanding economic ties with all states regardless of their political orientation.

After summit meetings (almost annually), the USSR and the USA signed agreements on the destruction of medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles (December 1987, Washington) and on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons (START-1, July 1991, Moscow).

At the same time, the USSR unilaterally decided to reduce defense spending and the size of its own armed forces by 500 thousand people.

The Berlin Wall has been destroyed. At a meeting with German Chancellor G. Kohl in February 1990 in Moscow, M. S. Gorbachev agreed to the unification of Germany. On October 2, 1990, the GDR became part of the Federal Republic of Germany.

In the countries of the socialist community, from the summer of 1988 to the spring of 1990, a series of popular revolutions took place (“ Velvet revolutions"), as a result of which power transfers peacefully (with the exception of Romania, where bloody clashes took place) from the communist parties to democratic forces. The forced withdrawal of Soviet troops from military bases in Central and Eastern Europe begins. In the spring of 1991, the dissolution of the CMEA and the Department of Internal Affairs was formalized.

In May 1989, M. S. Gorbachev paid a visit to Beijing. After this, cross-border trade was restored, and a series of important agreements on political, economic and cultural cooperation were signed.

Despite some successes, in practice, the “new thinking” became a policy of unilateral concessions to the USSR and led to the collapse of its foreign policy. Left without old allies and without acquiring new ones, the USSR quickly lost the initiative in international affairs and entered the wake of the foreign policy of the NATO countries.

The deterioration of the economic situation of the Soviet Union, noticeably aggravated due to a decrease in supplies through the former CMEA, prompted the Gorbachev administration to appeal in 1990-1991. for financial and material support from the G7 countries.

In the mid-80s. In the USSR, radical changes took place in ideology, public consciousness, political and state organization, and profound changes began in property relations and social structure. The collapse of the communist regime and the CPSU, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the formation in its place of new independent states, including Russia itself, the emergence of ideological and political pluralism, the emergence of civil society, new classes (among them the capitalist one) - these are just some of the new realities modern Russian history, the beginning of which can be dated to March - April 1985.

“Acceleration” strategy

IN April 1985, at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, M.S. Gorbachev

M.S.Gorbachev

outlined the strategic course of reform. They talked about the need for a qualitative transformation of Soviet society, its “renewal,” and profound changes in all spheres of life.

The key word of the reform strategy was “ acceleration" It was supposed to accelerate the development of means of production, scientific and technological progress, the social sphere, and even the activities of party bodies.

Terms “ perestroika" And " glasnost b” appeared later. Gradually the emphasis was shifted from “acceleration” to “perestroika” and it was this word that became symbol course produced by M.S. Gorbachev in the second half of the 80s.

Publicity meant identifying all the shortcomings that impede acceleration, criticism and self-criticism of performers “from top to bottom.” A perestroika assumed the introduction of structural and organizational changes to economic, social, political mechanisms, as well as ideology in order to achieve acceleration of social development.

To ensure the implementation of new tasks, some party and Soviet leaders were replaced. N.I. Ryzhkov was appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and E.A. Shevardnadze, who had previously been the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, was appointed Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In December 1985, B. N. Yeltsin became secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee. A. N. Yakovlev and A. I. Lukyanov were promoted to the highest party hierarchy.

In 1985, the center of economic transformations was given the task of technical re-equipment and modernization of enterprises. For this it was necessary accelerated development of mechanical engineering. This is how the main goal in the national economy was formulated. The “acceleration” program assumed advanced (1.7 times) development of mechanical engineering in relation to the entire industry and its achievement of a world level by the beginning of the 90s. The success of acceleration was associated with the active use of scientific and technological achievements, expansion of the rights of enterprises, improvement of personnel work, and strengthening of discipline at enterprises.

Meeting of M.S. Gorbachev with the workers of the Proletarsky district of Moscow. April 1985

The course proclaimed in 1985 at the April plenum was reinforced in February 1986. on XXVII Congress of the CPSU.

In the meeting room of the XXVII Congress of the CPSU. Kremlin Palace of Congresses. 1986

There were few innovations at the congress, but the main thing was support Law on Labor Collectives. The law proclaimed the creation of labor councils at all enterprises with broad powers, including the selection of management employees, regulation of wages in order to eliminate equalization and maintain social justice in wages and even determine the price of products.

At the XXVII Congress of the CPSU, promises were made to the Soviet people: to double the economic potential of the USSR by 2000, increase labor productivity by 2.5 times and provide each Soviet family with a separate apartment.

The majority of Soviet people believed the new General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev and enthusiastically supported him.

Course towards democratization

IN 1987. Serious adjustments to the reform course began.

Perestroika

There have been changes in the political vocabulary of the country's leadership. The word “acceleration” gradually fell out of use. New concepts have appeared, such as “ democratization”, “command and control system”, “braking mechanism”, “deformation of socialism" If previously it was assumed that Soviet socialism was fundamentally healthy, and that it was only necessary to “accelerate” its development, now the “presumption of innocence” from the Soviet socialist model was removed, and serious internal shortcomings were discovered that had to be eliminated and a new model created socialism.

IN January 1987. Gorbachev admitted the failure of the reform efforts of previous years, and saw the reason for these failures in the deformations that occurred in the USSR by the 30s.

Since it was concluded that “ deformations of socialism”, then it was supposed to eliminate these deformations and return to the socialism that was conceived by V.I. Lenin. This is how the slogan “ Back to Lenin”.

The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee argued in his speeches that in the “deformation of socialism” there were deviations from the ideas of Leninism. Lenin's concept of the NEP gained particular popularity. Publicists started talking about the NEP as the “golden age” of Soviet history, drawing analogies with the modern period of history. Economic articles on the problems of commodity-money relations, rent, and cooperation were published by P. Bunich, G. Popov, N. Shmelev, L. Abalkin. According to their concept, administrative socialism was to be replaced by economic socialism, which would be based on self-financing, self-financing, self-sufficiency, and self-government of enterprises.

But main, the central theme of perestroika times in the media became criticism of Stalin And command-administrative system generally.

This criticism was carried out much more fully and more mercilessly than in the second half of the 50s. On the pages of newspapers, magazines, and on television, revelations of Stalin's policies began, Stalin's direct personal participation in mass repressions was revealed, and the picture of the crimes of Beria, Yezhov, and Yagoda was recreated. The revelations of Stalinism were accompanied by the identification and rehabilitation of more and more tens of thousands of innocent victims of the regime.

The most famous works at this time were such works as “White Clothes” by V. Dudintsev, “Bison” by D. Granin, “Children of the Arbat” by A. Rybakov. The whole country read the magazines “New World”, “Znamya”, “October”, “Friendship of Peoples”, “Ogonyok”, where previously banned works of M. Bulgakov, B. Pasternak, V. Nabokov, V. Grossman, A. Solzhenitsyn were published , L. Zamyatina.

XIX All-Union Party Conference (June 1988)

At the end of the 80s. transformations affected the structure of state power. The new doctrine of political democracy was practically embodied in decisions XIX All-Union Party Conference, where for the first time the goal of creating a civil society in the USSR and excluding party bodies from economic management, depriving them of state functions and transferring these functions to the Soviets was proclaimed.

At the conference, a sharp struggle between supporters and opponents of perestroika unfolded over the issue of the country's development tasks. The majority of deputies supported the point of view of M.S. Gorbachev on the need for economic reform and transformation of the country's political system.

The conference approved the course to create in the country rule of law. Specific reforms of the political system were also approved, to be implemented in the near future. It was supposed to elect Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, the country's highest legislative body of 2,250 people. Moreover, two-thirds of the Congress were to be elected by the population on an alternative basis, i.e. from at least two candidates, and another third of the deputies, also on an alternative basis, were elected by public organizations. The congress, convened periodically to determine legislative policy and adopt higher laws, formed from its midst Supreme Council, which was supposed to work on a permanent basis and represent the Soviet parliament.

The balance of political forces in the country began to change dramatically in the fall of 1988. The main political change was that the previously united camp of perestroika supporters began to split: radical wing, which quickly gained strength, turned into a powerful movement in 1989, and in 1990 began to decisively challenge Gorbachev’s power. The struggle between Gorbachev and the radicals for leadership in the reform process formed the main core of the next stage of perestroika, which lasted from the autumn of 1988 to July 1990.

Conversation with Doctor of Economic Sciences Hegumen Philip (Simonov)

April 23, 1985 General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev announced plans for broad reforms aimed at a comprehensive renewal of society, the cornerstone of which was called “accelerating the socio-economic development of the country.”

And exactly 30 years ago, on October 15, 1985, the next Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee reviewed and approved the draft of the main directions of economic and social development of the USSR for 1986-1990 and for the period until 2000. Thus, the official start was given to a new economic course known as “perestroika.”

The consequences of numerous “reforms” and “transformations” that began in those years and continued in subsequent years are felt to this day. We talk with the abbot about what kind of economy they were “rebuilding”, what they wanted to achieve and why it turned out “as always”, what transformations our country really needed, what the “experience” of those years can teach us and what each of us Orthodox should do. Philip (Simonov), Doctor of Economic Sciences, Professor, Honored Economist of the Russian Federation, Head of the Department of Church History, Faculty of History, Moscow State University. M.V. Lomonosov.

Father Philip, they talk about two types of economic systems: command-administrative and market. What is their fundamental difference? What are the pros and cons?

First, let's say a few words about a certain community that unites these two concepts. This commonality lies in the fundamental economic illiteracy of those who introduced these terms for political reasons, then picked them up and used them as part of the political struggle, and those who brought these concepts - complete historical and political economic trash - to our time.

Any sane person, even without a higher economic education, not to mention academic degrees and titles, when discussing something, usually finds out its main characteristics. That is, trying to answer the question “what is this?”, he finds out which it is what are its characteristics that make it exactly this and not something else.

Therefore, speaking about the “market economy”, I immediately want to ask: which is this a market economy?

After all, the market existed and mediated exchange in slave-holding antiquity, and in the stage-incomprehensible East, and in feudal Europe, and in early capitalism, and in its later stages.

Public figures who abandoned political economy as a science due to its “dark Soviet past” and threw into society the term “market economy” as the main idea of a bright future, themselves acted very politically-economically: they used this meaningless term to fight for power, but They didn’t explain to anyone what kind of “market economy” we were talking about.

Everyone thought that it was socially oriented, with the preservation of the achievements that society already had (free education and healthcare, full employment, an 8-hour working day with a 41-hour working week, etc.), and with the acquisition of those preferences that the market provides (private economic initiative, increased management efficiency, improved quality based on competition, etc.).

But this is exactly what, as it turned out, no one guaranteed. Because what happened is what happened: a complete violation of the rights of workers, the rampant “gangster capitalism” in the spirit of the era of primitive accumulation of capital based on the unproven dogma “the market will decide everything”, the emergence of a system of almost feudal “feeding” and other delights that fit perfectly into a “market economy” - provided that no one has given an exact definition of this phenomenon. What has grown has grown.

Now about the “command system”. Don't you feel the economic disadvantage of the term itself? This is not the language of economic science, this is pure politics! By the way, no one has given a scientific definition to this term either - because from a theoretical point of view it is simply impossible.

Economic science does not speak about “market” and “command” economies, but about systems of directive and indicative planning

In science, there was a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of directive (as in the USSR) and indicative planning systems - the latter was the basis for the sectoral development of post-war European countries. On the basis of indicative planning, Gaullist France, for example, created its own competitive aerospace industry. Isn't this an indicator of the effectiveness of the method? By the way, the model of intersectoral balance, on which the Soviet model of planning and forecasting was based, was developed by an American economist of Russian origin, Nobel laureate Vasily Leontyev. Now we have come to our senses and adopted the unreadable law “On Strategic Planning in the Russian Federation”, only the system of this strategic forecasting has been so destroyed over 25 years that not only is there no one to calculate this very intersectoral balance, but there is no one to teach how to calculate it.

At the same time, the main problem was the limits of application of one or another model, which, in essence, determines the effectiveness of both. In short: is it possible to plan production to the maximum of the product range, or are there still some boundaries beyond which the inefficient use of economic resources begins?

The Western world limited itself to indicative planning, within the framework of which it was planned not production (in natural units), but the resources necessary for the development of this production - those industries that are recognized as priority for the economy at the moment. At the same time, a combination of public and private financing was envisaged: the state made initial investments in its priority sectors, setting a certain vector of development, and private capital, having this guideline, joined the investment process, increasing its efficiency.

The domestic economy, even in the conditions of that strange “market”, the transition to which began under Gorbachev, was unable to abandon the dogmas of directive planning “from above” (enterprises did not participate in the process of preparing the plan, but received ready-made planning tasks from the center), despite even though it began to very clearly demonstrate its shortcomings against the backdrop of growing well-being of the population and a corresponding increase in demand: an “economy of scarcity” arose, under the sign of which all Gorbachev’s years passed. Let us leave aside the question of how much of this deficit was a consequence of objective factors and how much of it was a man-made, deliberately organized matter. That's not the point. The question is that the government of that time failed to ensure the effective implementation of that speculative intersectoral balance that the State Planning Committee worked on in its last years; it was not possible to combine one’s own ideas about the standard of living of the country’s population with the ideas of this very population; it was not possible to separate economics from ideology (as, for example, China did).

- On October 15, 1985, the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee proclaimed a new economic course, known as “perestroika.” Please tell me what this meant for the Soviet Union?

The idea that “all of us, comrades, apparently need to rebuild ourselves” was first expressed by Gorbachev in May 1985. But even earlier, in 1983, in the leading party magazine “Communist”, the then General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu.V. Andropov set the task of accelerated “progress of the productive forces,” which was subsequently exploited by Gorbachev under the amorphous slogan of “acceleration.”

In essence, it came down to three streams of situational reform measures that were poorly linked to each other: « publicity» (which was reduced to rehashing in the media the negative aspects of Soviet history and life, without developing as a result any significant concept for the further development of society) - « cooperation» (to which we must add the epic of creating joint ventures with foreign capital, which ended, in general, ingloriously and did not make a significant contribution to economic growth; apologists for “perestroika” say that it was through cooperation and joint ventures that “elements were introduced into the socialist economy market,” but these elements existed before them, but what cooperation really brought into the economy were elements of a wild market, “gray” schemes, raiding, consumer deception - all that flourished in full bloom later, in the 1990s. e years) - « new thinking» (emphasis on M.S. Gorbachev) in foreign policy (in fact, it meant a rejection of the ideological imperative in diplomacy and a certain “warming” of relations with the West).

The reforms imposed by the IMF were designed for the economies of developing countries. They were not applicable to the developed economy of Russia

Ultimately, for the Soviet Union, all this resulted in an uncontrolled increase in borrowing on the world market of loan capital, where at that time they were very willing to give “loans under Gorbachev”, entering into an external debt crisis and receiving an IMF stabilization program (such a program since the 80s of the twentieth century was carried out in all countries that fell into a “debt spiral”), the condition for financing within the framework of which were those “reforms” that destroyed the country’s economy. And not only due to some malicious intent (although 1991 in the West was quite reasonably perceived as a brilliant victory in the Cold War, which, however, for a long time they could not understand what to do), but also because, as usual Western laziness, this program, the basics of which were developed for developing countries, was not designed for developed economies, and neither those who set the tasks nor those who thoughtlessly carried them out understood this.

The simplest example: “agrarian reform,” according to the stabilization program, implies the elimination of large inefficient land ownership (such as pre-revolutionary landownership), the formation of small peasant (farm) farms on the basis of actually confiscated lands and then their cooperation with the prospect of creating an agro-industrial complex capable of meeting the country’s needs for food. This model is valid, for example, for Upper Volta.

But in the former USSR there wasn't large landownership type. But then were cooperation and agro-industrial complex. No one noticed this.

As a result, large land cooperative property was cashed out, and in its place exactly what could be compared to ineffective latifundial landownership that did not produce a marketable product was formed. Former arable fields and feeding areas - those that are not built up with cottages - have been overgrown with undergrowth for 25 years, farmers have failed, and now we have to restore agriculture and cooperation - this word, by the way, was banned throughout the 1990s, even No articles have been published on this topic. And now our Ministry of Agriculture is planning to begin an Upper Volta-type reform in order to mitigate the consequences of the stupidity that was committed under the dictation of the IMF in the 1990s: to return unused farmland to the state land fund and find an effective way to ensure the restoration of their productive potential.

People have always called it: “A bad head gives no rest to your feet.”

In general, for the USSR, “perestroika” meant virtually a complete rejection of the political-economic and ideological model that the CPSU adhered to in the post-war period - in Lenin’s language (which was sharp with labels): opportunism and revisionism. With quite predictable consequences: “cooperation” (or rather, those capitals that arose on its basis and, naturally, showed their political ambitions) removed Gorbachev from the domestic political arena, and “glasnost” finally buried him as a politician along with the USSR destroyed by his hands.

What were the results of “perestroika”? Were the goals achieved? Is it fair to say that this led to the collapse of the USSR?

“Perestroika” could not lead to any real results: it was a voluntaristic policy that suited its creator situationally

Actually, I have already answered this question. “” could not lead to any real results: it was a voluntaristic policy that suited the situation of its creator, who tried to sit on all the chairs at once: to improve socialism, to preserve directive planning, and to introduce a capitalist market into this economic system, but never having implemented the ideas of self-financing, to be both the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the President - all in one bottle. Actually, there were no scientifically substantiated goals - there were some impulsive good wishes “between Lafite and Clicquot,” to which the Academy of Sciences frantically tried to give a scientific appearance.

And when there is no real - not situational, but scientifically based - development goal, from which the tools to achieve it follow, there cannot be a positive result by definition.

What changes did the Soviet Union really need? And what does the experience of the last decade of the Soviet Union teach us from the point of view of organizing economic life?

It must be said that the “Kremlin elders” of the last Soviet era did one great stupidity: they considered the entire people stupid.

Let me explain. I started traveling abroad on official business in the late 1980s. Yes, everything was good and beautiful there. In general, it’s more decent than what we had under Gorbachev. But there, in prosperous Vienna, I first saw homeless people with strollers that contained all their meager belongings. People who, in no less prosperous London in the winter, settled down to sleep under bridges in cardboard boxes at night, for whom, at Christmas, Bishop Anthony (Bloom) called on them to collect at least something that would make them feel the joy of Christ’s Birth. People who rummaged through garbage cans in search of food.

If the “elders” did not consider the Soviet people to be headless idiots, they would allow them to freely travel abroad - not on tour packages accompanied by the KGB, but freely, simply by taking a visa. We are not idiots, we, besides jeans and street cafes, would have seen something else that would have made us understand: tourism should not be confused with emigration. We were well aware that we were never in danger of becoming homeless or unemployed. We understood that we did not have to pay for education, and our education was such that our reports at international conferences were listened to with attention. We understood that we did not need to pay at the clinic or hospital, that we had already paid for this in the form of income tax.

And now we understand that we have to pay for everything - but where can we get it? Now, during the crisis, according to surveys, people no longer have enough money for food, the share of expenses for these purposes in total expenses is growing, some are already dipping into savings, and the quality of food is deteriorating. But it is absolutely impossible to fight for wages, because, unlike Europe, we do not have normal trade unions that would respond to the demands of workers, rather than satisfy their own needs.

In a healthy society, the state takes on the function of socially oriented distribution of funds

Here we are talking about church charity, we work to help the poor and homeless - but this help in itself is an indicator of the ill health of society, because in a healthy society there should be no socially unprotected sections, and the task of ensuring social protection (including ensuring full employment of the population) assumes the state, performing the function of socially oriented distribution of funds received from the population as taxes. And if the Church, which does not have a tax source of income, is forced to take on the function of social protection, performing it through voluntary donations (that is, in fact, re-taxing the population: after all, taxes have already been paid to the state, and we have the right to expect that the state will fulfill its social functions, since it is in this connection that it exists), this means that the state does not fulfill its constitutional functions, and society does not control it.

As for the experience of the time of “decline and fall of the USSR”. Back then they talked a lot about the Chinese model - but, unfortunately, no one really bothered to study this model in detail or justify the possibility of using its elements in the conditions of the Soviet economy: some looked lustfully at the West, others looked forward “back to Lenin” “, the economy, meanwhile, was suffocating from an ineffective management model, and where, under the guise of a “socialist market,” the management model changed (initially at the micro level, then, with the formation of organized groups, at a higher level), the processes of primitive accumulation of capital began with cruelty late Middle Ages and early modern times.

No real model was proposed based on its own economic complex, taking into account its features: the Central Committee of the CPSU, which actually ruled the country, rewrote old dogmas “from congress to congress,” and the scientific world tried, through meditation, to discover “new content” in them. Some “unknown forces” also intervened: I remember well how in one of the working groups on Old Square they were preparing a draft decree on foreign economic activity, they got excited and argued, by nightfall they finally did it and went home - and the next morning they read in the newspaper “ Pravda” text, where all our thoughts were written “exactly the opposite”... By whom? And why?

There can be only one conclusion: you need to know exactly what you are doing and what exactly should come out of it

Thus, there can be only one conclusion from this negative experience: you need to know firmly what exactly you are doing and what exactly should come out of it, and not today or tomorrow (“and after us there may be a flood”; “yes, we drink pits and drink in the morning.” we will die" - 1 Cor. 15: 32), and for years to come. If we talk about economics, there must be a development model consciously chosen as a goal with known characteristics, determined scientifically, and not “from the wind of its head” (too often we are guided not by economic reality, but by our own ideas about this reality); directions, methods and tools for achieving the set goal must be determined, ensuring, among other things, the stability of the national economy to internal and external stresses, which no one has canceled, no matter how much we want it; finally, there must be the right people who would not tell pleasant tales made up of their own ideas about reality, but would effectively work precisely for this goal, and not against it.

Otherwise, we will constantly be faced with unpleasant surprises: it suddenly turns out that we do not have self-sufficiency in food, then we suddenly realize that some industry has collapsed and as a result rockets are falling, or it turns out that the level of education has decreased to zero (by the way, according to surveys, almost half of the respondents, due to the abolition of school astronomy, are now sure that the sun revolves around the earth), otherwise suddenly an insight will occur, from which it will become clear that the world community was simply flirting with us like a cat with a mouse: they showed PR candy wrappers (like the notorious myth about “G-8”, which in practice never ceased to be “G-7”), but in reality they pursued the old policy of ousting a competitor from the market. And the number of such discoveries can multiply indefinitely.

What kind of economy should Russia have? What should we strive for? What potential for economic development, so to speak, is inherent in Orthodoxy and its ethics?

Effective, that is, ensuring the growth of produced national income and its distribution and redistribution to achieve development goals - and not of individual sectors, industries or industries, but of the entire economic complex of the country.

Based on scientific and technological progress, without which we will be doomed to lag behind world development.

Socially oriented, as it should be, the economy of the “welfare state”, which is spelled out in our Constitution, that is, satisfying the basic legitimate needs of the population - not just a certain part of it, but all citizens, since we are so fond of talking about “civil society”.

Diversified, that is, configured to provide a wide range of national needs and various areas of national security.

Integrated into the world economy not as a raw material appendage, but as an equal partner in the emerging global division of labor.

Life will show what place Orthodoxy can take in this system. Economics is a non-confessional phenomenon. Religious ethics (and this is the only and most important thing that faith can offer to participants in the economic process) begins to work when organizational processes begin to operate: in the organization of the production process and everything connected with it (rest time, disability, pensions, etc. .), as well as in the organization of distribution, exchange and consumption of the produced product (in a general sense). How fair will these organizational processes be, how focused on what the apostle indicated? uniformity(see 2 Cor. 8:14), how prepared a person will be for this justice in the process of education and upbringing - all this is not only important for religious ethics and its bearers, but is also an open field for influence.

And then everything will depend on how much we ourselves, the bearers of religious ethics, care about all these problems, how much we ourselves are rooted in Christ’s teaching, how much it is not external and temporary for us (that is, existing only when we enter from the world into church walls in order, as they say now, “to satisfy one’s religious needs”), but internally, experienced and assimilated, which has become not even a part of life, but life itself, to the extent that we ourselves are “not strangers and not aliens, but fellow citizens saints and members of God’s household” (Eph. 2:19).

Those who belong to God cannot be completely alien to economic reality

Look how this “our own” sounds in Greek: οἰκεῖοι (ikíii). Those who inhabit God's οἶκος (ikos), who - their To God, οἰκεῖοι, domestici, His household, those cannot be absolutely alien to economic reality. They are like members Houses, by virtue of their rights and obligations, certainly participate, to their own extent, in its creation and organization - economy.

And what other participation does the Master of the house expect from us, if not evidence, not preaching the Gospel of His beloved Son - “not the letter, but the Spirit, for the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life” (2 Cor. 3: 6), - “even to the ends of the earth” (Acts 1: 8).

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Reasons for perestroika in the USSR

1. Systemic socio-economic crisis caused by the arms race in the foreign policy of the USSR, the financial dependence of the socialist countries on Soviet subsidies. Reluctance to change the command-administrative economic system in accordance with new conditions - in domestic politics (“stagnation”).

2. There were also accompanying prerequisites and reasons for perestroika in the USSR: the aging of the Soviet elite, whose average age was within 70 years; the omnipotence of the nomenklatura; strict centralization of production; shortage of both consumer goods and durable goods.

All these factors led to an awareness of the changes necessary for the further development of Soviet society. These changes began to be personified by M. S. Gorbachev, who became the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in March 1985.

The course of events of perestroika in the USSR

To uncover and master the topic, you need to remember a number of processes that were embodied in the era of perestroika in the USSR. The first of them is publicity. Publicity manifested itself in the weakening of censorship, in legalization (legality) pluralism, when alternative, other points of view on the development of the USSR began to be recognized in politics. Unhindered discussion of the political, socio-economic and cultural life of the country became possible. The consequence of glasnost was the emergence of many fly-by-night parties, alternative publications, etc.

Glasnost led to the fact that in March 1990, Article 6 of the USSR Constitution on the leading role of the CPSU in society was abolished. This led to the split of the CPSU into a number of parties. A noticeable role in the political life of the country from the first days of its creation was played by the Communist Party of the RSFSR (KPRF) and the Russian Party of Communists (RCP). The Russian Communist Workers' Party (RCWP) took shape. At the initial stage of their activity, they all saw their main task as returning to communist ideology (taking into account the changes that had taken place in the country), as well as strengthening the role of the state in economic life.

The following process is acceleration of socio-economic development. The essence of acceleration was announced at the April plenum of the Central Committee (Central Committee) of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) in 1985. Acceleration was understood as greater integration of science and technology, decentralization of management in the economy, development of the private sector of the economy with the dominance of the public sector for now.

In essence, it was about replacing the command-administrative economic system with a mixed one. From the social studies course you should know the signs of all three types of management;). Acceleration led to laws “On the general principles of entrepreneurship in the USSR”, “On cooperatives”, “On the state enterprise”. However, these measures did not lead to the expected effect.

In foreign policy, perestroika in the USSR during the reign of M.S. Gorbachev led to the so-called "velvet revolutions". The fact is that glasnost and the weakening of censorship revealed not only socio-economic problems and contradictions within the socialist camp, but also led to the growth of nationalist sentiments in the countries of this camp.

In 1989, the Berlin Wall collapsed and Germany began to unite into one state. The Cold War is over. In countries where there were socialist regimes, liberal-democratic regimes are emerging, and there is a breakthrough towards market and mixed economic systems. The camp of socialism finally collapsed in 1989-90, when the countries of the socialist camp declared themselves sovereign, a phenomenon arose "Parade of Sovereignties". The United States issued a medal for victory in the Cold War.

Collapse of the USSR occurred on December 6, 1991, in Belovezhskaya Pushcha (BSSR), a meeting of the leaders of the three sovereign states of Russia (B.N. Yeltsin), Ukraine (L. Kravchuk) and Belarus (S. Shushkevich) took place. On December 8, they announced the termination of the 1922 union treaty and the end of the activities of state structures of the former Union. At the same time, an agreement was reached on the creation of the CIS Commonwealth of Independent States. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ceased to exist.

Results of perestroika in the USSR

1. The weakening of the command-administrative economic system and the attempt to transform it led to an explosion of political, socio-economic and nationalist contradictions that had formed throughout the previous development of the USSR.

2. The arms race and other prerequisites indicated above led to uncontrollable processes in the internal political development of the USSR.

3. All these factors led to the collapse of the USSR. Also, do not forget that American President Ronald Reagan began to call the USSR the “evil empire” 😉

4. Of course, there were also subjective reasons. One of them is the desire to destroy everything at once, which, in my opinion, is characteristic of most Russians. We need everything at once! This psychology was confirmed, in particular, by the program of S.S. Shatalin and G.A. Yavlinsky’s “500 days”, which provides for a transition from a command-administrative system to a market system in 500 days! It is absurd, in my opinion, to blame the collapse of the USSR only on M.S. Gorbachev or exclusively on “American intelligence” - this is an everyday level.

A systemic crisis has been brewing in the country for a long time and it has manifested itself. Yes, if you have 90% of the power and you want to destroy the system, you will destroy it - and it’s not even a question! But in my opinion, the reasons for the collapse of the USSR were laid down even under I.V. Stalin, when people were accustomed to obey the center, which a priori should have had not only 90% of power and 100% of authority. It is not the fault of the subsequent leaders of the USSR that they did not have it.

In general, this is such a difficult topic. I will devote further posts to such related topics at the intersection of history and social science as the development of Russia in the 90s and global problems of our time. Of course, I know that now the school curriculum includes topics almost up to 2012. This, in my opinion, is nonsense, because history is events that happened at least 20-25 years ago... Everything else is pure political science and sociology! Well, okay - we'll figure it out.

You, of course, my dear reader, can leave comments on this post and state your point of view on the specified period! Don't forget to subscribe to the following posts on the site!

Perestroika jokes

The era of perestroika in the USSR remained in people's memory as the collapse of a great country. And of course, in order to overcome this difficult event, people created jokes that were both funny and sad at the same time. But they also help to understand the essence of the era.

— What did your plant do before perestroika?
- Released tanks.
- And now?
— And now we make baby strollers.
- Well, how about they buy it?
— They buy it, only some picky mothers complain that it’s inconvenient to pull the child out through the tower

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