Theme number 2. The army of the Russian Empire

Lecture No. 2. The origin and strengthening of the regular Armed Forces

Russian Empire.

Study questions:

Peter's military reform 1. Creation of a regular army, manning, composition, weapons.

Wars of the Russian Empire in the XVIII century. Military leadership of Peter 1, P.S. Saltykova, P.A. Rumyantseva, A.V. Suvorov, F.F. Ushakov.

Introduction

The end of the 17th and the beginning of the 18th centuries were a turning point in the history of the Russian state. This period is characterized by the completion of the formation of an absolutist (unrestricted monarchy) state. Time demanded the strengthening of the central state power. The formation of a noble empire was accompanied simultaneously with the reorganization of the entire state apparatus, the creation of a regular army and navy.

The implementation of the Petrine reforms was significantly complicated by the unfavorable historical situation for Russia.

As a result of the fact that Russia was under the heavy Tatar yoke for a long time, it fell behind economically and culturally from the advanced countries of Western Europe.

Russia's loss of access to the Baltic and Black Seas also hindered the further development of the Russian economy, hindered economic and cultural communication with Western Europe.

In the conditions of the rapid capitalist development of Western Europe, the economic backwardness of Russia threatened in the future with the loss of its economic and national independence.

The main stage of the military reforms of Peter the Great took a little more than a decade and a half. In terms of scale, speed and effectiveness, they have no equal in world history. Not a single reformer had to deal in such conditions and for such short term bring the army to the forefront.

Historians have argued and continue to argue a lot about the originality of the imitation of Peter's reforms. It should be noted that any military reformers in the world were guided by some models. Of course, one cannot deny the foreign (European) influence on Peter's reforms. But Peter did not take anything on faith, did not borrow mechanically. His own military experience and the national interests of Russia were decisive in his transformations.

1. Peter's military reform 1. Creation of a regular army, manning, composition, weapons.

In the Russian state at the end of the 17th - the first half of the 18th centuries. major economic and political transformations are taking place. This period is characterized by the development of manufactory, the growth of the all-Russian market, the formation of the Russian noble empire, and the increase in the feudal oppression of the peasants.

Russia in the first quarter of the eighteenth century. turns into a powerful state.

End of the 17th and beginning of the 18th centuries were a turning point in the history of the Russian state, there is a need for reforms that would affect all spheres of life and activity: the economy, government, social relations, military affairs, culture and life.

Professors of Moscow University, legal historians S.M. Soloviev (1820-1879) and K.D. Kavelin (1818-1885), studying the pre-Petrine era, were inclined to think that Russia in the 17th century. came to a state crisis, complete failure, moral, economic and administrative, and could get on the right track only through radical reforms.

As a result of the fact that Russia was under the heavy Tatar-Mongol yoke for a long time, it fell behind economically and culturally from the advanced countries of Western Europe.

Russia's loss of access to the Baltic and Black Seas also hindered the further development of the Russian economy, hindered economic and cultural communication with Western Europe. Under the conditions of the rapid capitalist development of Western Europe, the backwardness of Russia threatened in the future with the loss of its economic and national independence.

One of the most important tasks facing the Russian state was to gain access to the Baltic Sea. The economic growth of the Russian state required extensive connections with international markets.

However, the armed forces of Russia by the end of the seventeenth century. did not meet the requirements of the time and could not solve the new tasks that arose before the state.

The conservative state system, economic backwardness predetermined the conservatism of the military organization.

More than a hundred thousandth old Moscow army outwardly looked impressive. The command staff, imitating the Polish example, had expensive weapons of the eastern type, thoroughbred argamaks in harness with precious stones and luxurious clothes.

Ordinary warriors, armed mainly with edged weapons, endured the hardships of the march, cold and hunger well. The local cavalry was armed with various types of bows, sabers and darts and outlived its time. Unlike the Swedish and French nobility, the Prussian Junkers and the Polish gentry, the Russian nobles were deprived of military ambition and incentive to serve for the estate. Their service at that time was life-long, obligatory, but temporary-episodic.

The once dashing archers were more concerned with the problems of personal economy, trade and crafts, but having significant strength and influence, they sometimes interfered in state affairs and the life of the court, became uncontrollable and dangerous for the king himself and state authorities. In the Azov campaigns of Peter I, the archers showed low fighting qualities and reliability in comparison with the newly formed regular regiments: Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky.

Soldiers, spearmen, reiters and dragoons of the troops of the "new" or "foreign" system, which accounted for 60-70% of the total number of armed forces, experienced a great attraction to service and turned, in fact, into a militia, like a local cavalry.

The prestige of the Russian army was low both among Europeans (Russia was in twelfth place in the tables of European states) and among the Ottoman Turks.

However, the great economic and human potential allowed Russia to maintain a large army, fairly strong heavy artillery, as well as regular units of the Cossacks and the steppes.

Military doctrine of the seventeenth century. can be called defensive, cautious, as well as foreign policy. Advanced Western military art at that time, the experience of organizing the army was practically not used in the armed forces of Russia.

Heavy defeats at Konotop (1659) near Lyakhovichi and Chudnov (1660), the failure of the Crimean campaigns (1687 and 1689), the shameful flight of the local cavalry from the battlefield near Narva in 1700 raised the question of urgent military reforms.

Thus, transformations seemed to be a natural historical necessity.

The solution of the urgent problems for Russia at that time is associated with the activities of Tsar Peter I (the Great) (1672-1725), who carried out at the end of the 17th - the first quarter of the 18th centuries. major economic, political and military transformations.

The amazing energy of Peter I, the speed and sharpness of the reform movement, selfless devotion to the idea, disinterested service to the cause, the genius and character of Peter I give the full historical content of the thought about the organic connection of reforms with the general course of Russian life.

Therefore, the time of the reign of Peter I seems to our consciousness to be the line that separates old Rus' from the transformed Russia.

Peter I is highly regarded as a statesman, military figure and commander. F. Engels called Peter I "a truly great man." A.V. Suvorov called Peter I "the first commander of his century." Being a talented commander, naval commander and military theorist, Peter I laid the foundation for a military school, from which came Rumyantsev, Suvorov, Kutuzov, Ushakov.

The military reforms of Peter I have no equal in world history in terms of scale, speed and effectiveness. Not a single reformer had to bring the army to the forefront under such conditions and in such a short time.

The military reforms of Peter I were not an imitation of the Western European system, they were a further step in the development of the Russian armed forces.

In some works of pre-revolutionary military literature, especially "Westerners", Peter I is described as a brilliant specialist in "transferring to Russian soil" someone else's Western European experience, however, taking into account the Russian situation. Such an interpretation of the role of Peter I leads to a denial of independence in the development of Russian military art, proclaims its dependence in basic matters on Western European models. Such views distort history.

It is impossible to fight with the enemy without studying the organization of his army, weapons, methods of war and combat. That is why Peter I was interested in and studied the structure of the Western European armies, knew their weak and strengths. Peter I did not fence off the "Chinese wall" from the combat experience of the Western European armies; at the first stage of his activity, he often invited foreigners to the Russian service, trusting them too much. However, this does not give the right to reduce the activities of an outstanding commander to the "skillful transfer" of Swedish, Prussian or any other military models to Russian soil.

Peter I developed as a commander based on the study and use of domestic military experience. He knew the military activities of his predecessors well. So, Ivan IV (the Terrible) he considered his "predecessor and model."

The historical role of Peter I in the development of Russian military art lies in the fact that, relying on the centuries-old military practice of Russia, he ensured the further development of military affairs in accordance with contemporary historical conditions.

What socio-economic conditions ensured the implementation of military reforms? The basis of the social system of the Russian state in the times of Peter the Great was the feudal economy. The social content of the reform was the strengthening of the class positions of the nobility and merchants, the peasantry merged with serfdom into one taxable category, became under the personal power of the landowner, the townspeople received organization, the right to self-government and some privileges.

As a result of the emergence and growth of manufactories, the development of domestic and foreign trade, the feudal economy inevitably had to be more and more drawn into market relations, to adapt to the domestic market. From this, however, it does not follow that the Petrine period was a period of destruction of feudal forms of economy. The elements of the new production relations grew, but were still insufficient to change the organization of the feudal economy.

The government of Peter I set as its main goal the access of Russia to the shores of the Baltic Sea, the return of the lands that belonged to Russia from time immemorial. This task required an exceptional effort of all the forces of the Russian state.

Military reforms covered all aspects of the life of the Russian army in the first quarter of the 18th century, and the result of their implementation was that in terms of organization, armament, and combat training, Peter I put the Russian army and navy at the forefront in Europe.

The main directions and content of the military reforms of Peter I:

Creation of the Russian (national) regular army and navy;

Introduction of a recruiting system;

Formation and introduction of the same type of organization and weapons in the infantry, cavalry and artillery;

The introduction of a unified system of military training and indoctrination, regulated by the charters;

Centralization of military administration;

Replacement of Orders - by the Military Collegium and the Admiralty Collegium;

Establishment of the position of commander-in-chief, under which a field headquarters was created, headed by a quartermaster general;

Opening military schools for officer training;

Regulation of the service of officers;

Carrying out military-judicial reforms.

The implementation of military reforms required enormous efforts of the entire state, and internal activity itself became dependent on military needs. Peter I was looking for ways to improve the economic condition of the state, to encourage industry and trade, in which he always saw a powerful source of people's well-being.

The new administrative structure took on a finished, slender appearance. Transformations were carried out regarding estates, administration, church administration.

The nobles were involved in serving the state service in the army and navy with great severity, indefinitely, as long as they had enough strength. No more than one third of each "surname" was admitted to the civil service. Under Peter I, the differences between local and patrimonial ownership were eliminated. The decree of 1714 prohibited the splitting of land holdings when bequeathing to sons. This made it possible to actively involve the children of noble landowners in the public service.

In 1708, Russia was divided into provinces (gubernias were divided into counties), at the head of which governors were placed.

In 1711, the Senate was established - the highest administrative body of the state with a judicial function, but without legislative power. Under the jurisdiction of the Senate was a number of central institutions of the colleges, they were established in 1718. All the colleges were established twelve, including foreign affairs, the military, admiralty, justice college, and others. Each had its own charter that determined its department and office work.

As a result of the measures taken in relation to industry, more than 200 factories and plants were founded in Russia under Peter I, and many branches of production were launched. Exploration was undertaken of the natural resources that Russia possessed. Foreign technicians were invited to Russia to train Russians in production, and Russians were also sent abroad to study various branches of Western industry.

Peter I connected his new harbor of St. Petersburg with Moscow by waterways, built (in 1711) the Vyshnevolotsky canal, and then Ladoga.

The Ural metallurgy, which overtook the English and Swedish ones, came out on top in the world. The mining industry has been greatly developed. The Tula arms factories were expanded. High-quality Ural iron made it possible to produce cast-iron tools of a quality no worse than bronze ones, which greatly expanded the production base of the Russian military industry.

Peter I presented more stringent requirements for the standard production of weapons.

To meet the needs of the army in guns, it was necessary to increase the size of the production of firearms, to master the production of new models. Despite the difficult conditions already in 1708-1709. the production of guns was equal to 15-20 thousand pieces per year, and by 1711 reached 40 thousand pieces. This number of guns fully satisfied the needs of the armed forces.

By 1710, the creation of a new military-industrial base was basically completed, which fully satisfied the needs of the army and navy. The further rapid growth of industrial production expanded and strengthened it.

Military reforms and war demanded large funds. Peter I managed to significantly increase state revenues by increasing indirect taxes and reforming direct taxes. This was achieved by the creation of new taxes, a strict search for old taxes, i.e. a greater degree of exploitation of the payment forces of the people. After 1700 salt pans, beekeepers, fishing, mills, became quitrent articles of the state treasury. From our point of view, wall taxes were sometimes introduced: the beards of the "bearded men" who did not want to shave were subject to duty; took tolls from the baths; a very high price was charged for oak coffins, the sale of which became a state monopoly, the Raskolniks had to bear a double taxable salary. Stamped paper is introduced for office work, filing complaints and petitions. The state-owned drinking and tobacco monopolies are flourishing. Indirect taxes under Peter I accounted for more than half of the state's revenues.

The other half was a direct poll tax. Each landlord peasant paid 70 kopecks. per year, state peasant - 114 kopecks. city ​​dweller - 120 kopecks.

New taxes were a heavy burden on the shoulders of the tax-paying people, there was discontent among the people, and the escapes under Peter took on large proportions.

However, thanks to financial measures, Peter I significantly increased the amount of state income (at the end of the 17th century, the income was 2 million rubles, in 1710 - 3 million 134 thousand rubles, in 1722 - 7 million 850 thousand rubles, in 1725 - 10 million 186 thousand rubles), which made it possible to significantly reduce the huge deficit of the beginning of the 18th century.

In the field of church administration, Peter I abolishes patriarchal authority, and on February 14, 1721, the opening of the "Holy Governing Synod" takes place. The composition of the Synod and the external organization were similar to secular boards. The question of the relationship between church and state was decided in favor of the latter.

Thus, by establishing the Synod, Peter I retained authoritative power in the Russian Church, but deprived this power of that political influence with which the patriarchs could act. In the era of Peter the attitude of the government and the church towards the Gentiles became softer than it had been in the 17th century. In 1721, the Synod issued an important decree allowing the marriages of Orthodox Christians with Protestants and Catholics.

Along with religious tolerance, there were repressions against schismatics, since Peter saw them as opponents of his civic activities and the dominant church.

The attitude to the reforms and innovations of Peter were varied. Not everyone understood what Peter was striving for, not everyone could consciously relate to the transformations. To the masses, the reforms seemed strange, unnecessary and were attributed to the personal whim of their king. There was dissatisfaction of the people, there were various rumors about the personality of the king, his activities. But discontent did not turn into a general open resistance to Peter. The people, however, left the burden of state life in droves - to the Cossacks, to Siberia and even to Poland. In 1705 there was a riot in Astrakhan. In 1707, there was a revolt among the Bashkirs and on the Don among the Cossacks, led by Ataman Bulavin. The rebellion was severely suppressed. Peter did not weaken government control over the Cossacks either.

However, many individuals, not only from the upper strata of society, but also from the masses, became active employees of the sovereign and apologists for his transformations.

When Peter I died and his reform activities ended, when his successors, not understanding him, often stopped and spoiled what he started, Peter's work did not die and Russia could not return to its former state. The fruits of his activity - the external strength of Russia and the new order within the country - were in front of everyone, and the burning enmity of the discontented became a memory.

"We now fully understand that his personality and vices are the product of his time, and his activities and historical merits are a matter of eternity."

As you know, the great sovereign Peter Alekseevich made many transformations in our country. Historians can spend hours listing the innovations of the reformer tsar, they will also note that under Peter 1, the army was formed on the basis of a set of recruits.

Peter carried out a very serious military reform, which strengthened Russian empire and contributed to the fact that our country and its army turned out to be stronger than the conqueror Charlemagne, who kept all of Europe at that time in fear.

But first things first.

Why was there a need to carry out army reform?

When Peter Alekseevich was crowned king together with his brother John Alekseevich, the army in Russia was as follows:

1. Of the regular units - archery regiments, Cossack formations and foreign mercenaries.
2. From temporary formations in case military threat- local troops, which were assembled from peasants and artisans by large feudal lords.

During the turbulent 17th century, our country experienced many military upheavals, as a result, it was saved from the Time of Troubles not only by the military courage of regular units, but also by the forces

Were there any attempts to create a regular army before Peter the Great?

ABOUT regular army, in which recruitment duty would be present, Peter's father, Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, also thought. However, the sudden death did not allow him to carry out all his military plans, although the king tried to partially bring them to life.

His eldest son and heir was seriously ill, it was difficult for him to govern the state, he died shortly after the death of his father.

The sister of Peter and John - the heirs to the throne - Tsarevna Sofya Alekseevna, who actually appropriated the power of her young brothers, relied on the archers. It was through the teaching of people loyal to Sophia that she actually received royal power.

However, the archers demanded privileges from her, and Sophia did not skimp on them. Her faithful assistants thought little about their service, so the army of the Russian state at that time was relatively weak compared to the armies of other European states.

What did Peter do?

As you know, the path of Peter the Great to power was very difficult, his sister interfered with him, wishing him dead. As a result, the young king managed to win the battle with Sophia, brutally suppressing her supporters of the archers.

The young sovereign dreamed of military victories, but where could they come from in a country that actually did not have a regular army?

Peter, with his characteristic fervor, zealously set to work.

So, under Peter 1, the army was formed on the basis of completely new principles.

The tsar began by equipping his two "amusing regiments" - Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky - according to the European model. They were commanded by foreign mercenaries. Shelves showed themselves with better side during the battle of Azov, so already in 1698 the old troops were completely disbanded.

In return, the tsar ordered a recruitment of new military men. From now on, over every settlement in the country there was a recruiting duty. It was necessary to provide a certain number of young physically strong men for their service to the Tsar and the Fatherland.

Military conversions

As a result, it was possible to recruit about 40,000 people, who were divided into 25 infantry regiments and 2 cavalry. The commanders were mostly foreign officers. The training of soldiers was carried out very strictly and according to the European model.

Peter was impatient to go into battle with his new army. However, his first military campaign ended in defeat near Narva.

But the king did not give up. Under Peter 1, the army was formed on the basis of recruitment, and this became a condition for its success. In 1705, the king issued an order, according to which such a set was to become regular.

What was this service like?

The service for the soldiers was long and hard. The service life was 25 years. Moreover, for the courage shown in battle, a simple soldier could rise to the rank of officer. Peter generally did not like lazy offspring from wealthy families, so if he noticed that some discharged young nobleman shied away from his duties in the service, he did not spare him.

Particular importance was given to the military training of the nobility, which was obliged to carry military service also 25 years old. In exchange for this service, the nobles received land plots with peasants from the state.

What has changed?

Despite the fact that the population reacted negatively to the heavy recruitment duty, trying in every possible way to evade it (young people were sent to monasteries, assigned to other classes, etc.), the army of Peter I grew. At the moment when the Swedish king Karl decided to defeat our country, Peter already had 32 infantry regiments, 2 regiments of guards and 4 regiments of grenadiers. In addition, there were 32 special ones. It was about 60,000 well-trained soldiers under the command of experienced officers.

Such an army was a huge force, which ensured the Russian sovereign his military victories in the near future.

The results of Peter's reform

As a result, by his death in 1725, the tsar created an entire military machine, which was distinguished by its power and efficiency in military affairs. Of course, the creation of the army by Peter 1 is a great merit of the sovereign. In addition, the tsar created special economic institutions that ensured the existence of his army, created service regulations, recruitment duty, etc.

Representatives of all estates were obliged to serve in this army, including the clergy (priests performed their direct functions in it).

Thus, we can say with confidence that under Peter 1, the army was formed on the basis of a general recruitment set. It was a strict and strong military system, a well-coordinated social mechanism that ensured the fulfillment of its main task - to protect the country from external threats at that turbulent time.

Seeing such an army, the Western powers simply lost their desire to fight with Russia, which ensured our country's relatively successful development in the following centuries. In general, the army created by Peter, in its main features, lasted until 1917, when it was destroyed under the onslaught of the well-known revolutionary events in our country.

Moscow government of the 17th century. had hundreds of thousands of armed men and at the same time was clearly aware of the lack proper organization and the combat readiness of their troops, We have already talked about the shortcomings of the noble militia, inactive "and deprived of proper military training. We also mentioned that already in the 17th century in Moscow they tried to arrange the right troops, increasing the number of archery regiments and forming regiments " foreign system "(soldiers, reiters, dragoons) from people of different social states. With the help of foreign officers, great results were achieved; by the time of Peter the soldiers had already grown to the size of an impressive military force. However, both the archery and regular regiments had one large , from a military point of view, a disadvantage: and archers (in more), and the soldiers (to a lesser extent) were not only military people, they were engaged in more than one service. Settled on state lands, having the right to marry and engage in crafts, soldiers, and especially archers, became a semi-military, semi-industrial class. Under such conditions, their combat readiness and military qualities could not be high.

Peter I changed the organization of the troops. Using the old military material, he made the regular regiments the dominant, even exclusive type of military organization (only the Little Russian and Don Cossacks retained the old structure). In addition, having changed the life of the soldiers, he began to replenish the troops differently than before. Only in this respect can he be considered the creator of the new Russian army. Giving it such a name, we must remember that the regular army (perfect or not, is another question) was created already in the 17th century.

Artillery troops of Peter I

Peter I tied the soldier exclusively to the service, tearing him away from home and trade. Military service under him ceased to be the duty of some nobles, archery and soldier's children, and "walking" hunters. This obligation now fell on all classes of society, except for the clergy and citizens belonging to the guilds. The nobles were all obliged to serve indefinitely as soldiers and officers, except for the infirm and seconded to the civil service. The correct recruiting sets were made from the peasants and townspeople, which at the beginning of the Swedish war were very frequent and gave Peter I huge contingents of recruits. In 1715, the Senate decided, as a norm for recruiting, to take one recruit from 75 households of the owner's peasants and serfs. Probably, approximately the same norm was for state-owned peasants and townspeople. Recruits from the tax-paying classes in the troops became on the same position as the soldiers-nobles, learned the same military equipment, and the whole mass of serving people made up a homogeneous army, not inferior in its fighting qualities to the best European troops.

The results achieved in this respect by the extremely energetic activity of Peter I were brilliant: at the end of his reign, the Russian regular army consisted of 210,000 people. In addition, there were about 100,000 Cossack troops. The fleet included 48 battleships, 787 galleys and small craft, and 28,000 men.

Addition

Russian army under Peter I (according to the lectures of V. O. Klyuchevsky)

Military reform of Peter I

The military reform was the primary transformative work of Peter I, the longest and most difficult both for himself and for the people; it has a very importance in our history; this is not just a question of national defense: the reform had a profound effect both on the fabric of society and on the further course of events.

Moscow army before the reform

According to the painting of 1681 (lecture LI), a much larger part of the Moscow rati had already been transferred to a foreign system (89 thousand to 164 thousand without the Little Russian Cossacks). The reformation hardly continued. The 112,000-strong army, which in 1689 Prince V.V. Golitsyn led on the second Crimean campaign, included the same 63 regiments of a foreign system, as in the painting of 1681, only up to 80 thousand, with a reduced composition of the regiments , although the noble mounted militia of the Russian system was listed as no more than 8 thousand, 10 times less than the foreign system, and according to the painting of 1681, it was only 5-6 times less. Therefore, the composition of the forces sent in 1695 to the first Azov campaign. In the 30,000-strong corps that went with Peter himself, then a company bombardier of the Preobrazhensky Regiment, one can count no more than 14,000 soldiers of a foreign system, while a huge 120,000-strong militia, sent by sabotage to the Crimea, all consisted of warriors of the Russian system, i.e. that is, in essence, non-combatants, who did not know the ranks, in the words of Kotoshikhin, mainly from the equestrian noble militia. Where did such a non-combatant mass come from and where did the 66,000 soldiers of a foreign system go, who, minus the 14,000 who marched with Peter near Azov, participated in the Crimean campaign of 1689? The answer to this was given at the feast of 1717, known to us, by Prince Ya. F. Dolgoruky, who was familiar with the state of the Moscow army under Tsar Fyodor and Princess Sophia, who was the first comrade of Prince V. V. Golitsyn in the second Crimean campaign. He then told Peter that his father, the tsar, showed him the way by organizing regular troops, “yes, all his senseless institutions were ruined along it,” so that Peter I had to do everything again and bring it to a better condition.

The recall of Prince Dolgoruky could not apply either to Tsar Fedor or Princess Sophia: on the eve of the fall of the princess, in the second Crimean campaign, the regiments of the foreign system were in good order. But the nobility provided active support to Peter's mother in the fight against Tsarevna Sophia and her archers, and with the fall of the princess, all these Naryshkins, Streshnevs, Lopukhins surfaced upstairs, clinging to the stupid queen, who were not up to the improvement of state defense. They, apparently, lowered the nobility, weighed down by the foreign system, to the easier, Russian. And Peter I found the recruitment of the troops in complete disorder. Previously, soldier and reytar regiments, disbanded to their homes in peacetime, were called up for service if necessary. It was a call for vacation or spare, experienced people already familiar with the system. When Peter was forming an army to fight Sweden, such a reserve was no longer noticeable.

Grenadier of the army of Peter I

The regiments of the foreign system were replenished in two ways: either "freemen were called into soldiers", hunters, or they collected from the landowners contingent, recruits, according to the number of peasant households. Peter I ordered to write freed serfs and peasants fit for service as soldiers, and even gave serfs the freedom to enter the soldiers' regiments without leave from the masters. With such recruitment, the regiments of recruits hastily drawn up, hastily trained by the Germans, in the words of the former in Moscow in 1698 - 1699. Secretary of the Austrian embassy Korb, were a rabble of the worst soldiers, recruited from the poorest rabble, "the most sorrowful people", in the words of another foreigner who lived in Russia in 1714-1719, the Brunswick resident Weber. The first army of Peter the Great in the Great Northern War was composed in a similar way: 29 new regiments from freemen and slave regiments of 1000 people each were fastened to 4 old regiments, 2 guards and 2 personnel. Narva discovered their fighting quality. [...]

Read about the formation of a regular army by Peter I in the article " Recruitment set»

Baltic Fleet

Since the beginning Northern war the Azov squadron was abandoned, and after the Prut, the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov was also lost. All the efforts of Peter turned to the creation of the Baltic fleet. Back in 1701, he dreamed that he would have up to 80 big ships. A crew was hastily recruited: in 1702, according to Prince Kurakin, "young guys were called in as sailors and recruited from 3 thousand people." In 1703, the Lodeynopol shipyard launched 6 frigates: this was the first Russian squadron that appeared on the Baltic Sea. By the end of the reign, the Baltic fleet included 48 battleships and up to 800 galleys and other small ships with 28 thousand crew. To manage, recruit, train, maintain and equip this entire regular army, a complex military-administrative mechanism was created with the collegiums of the Military and Admiralty, Artillery Chancellery headed by the Feldzeugmeister General, with the Provisional Office under the command of the Provisional Master General, with the Chief Commissariat under the control a general-kriegs commissar for receiving recruits and placing them on regiments, for distributing salaries to the army and supplying them with weapons, uniforms and horses; more to be added here General base led by the generals, which, according to the report card of 1712, consisted of two field marshals, Prince Menshikov and Count Sheremetev, and 31 generals, including 14 foreigners. The troops received the specified uniform. If you happen to look at illustrated publications on the military history of Russia, stop your attention on the Peter's guardsman in a dark green German-style caftan, in a low, flattened three-cornered hat, armed with a gun with a "baguinet" screwed to it, a bayonet.

military spending

The following technical changes formed the basis for the regular reorganization of the military forces: in the order of recruitment, the hunters' equipment was replaced by a recruiting set; peaceful personnel regiments, "elected", as they were then called, turned into a permanent regimental set; in the ratio of types of weapons, a decisive numerical predominance of infantry over cavalry is given; completed the final transition to the official content of the armed forces. These changes, and especially the last one, have greatly raised the cost of maintaining the army and navy. The estimate only for the general staff, which did not exist before Peter I, already in 1721 was reduced to the amount of 111 thousand rubles (about 900 thousand for our [pre-revolutionary Russian] money). According to the estimate of 1680, the cost of the troops reached almost 10 million rubles for our money. Throughout the reign of Peter I, the land army grew and became more expensive, and by 1725 the expenditure on it more than quintupled, exceeded 5 million rubles of that time, and 1.5 million rubles went to the fleet; in complexity, this amounted to 52–58 million rubles with our money, at least two-thirds of the entire revenue budget at that time.

Russian army before the war. By the beginning of the war with Sweden, Peter I was in a hurry to rebuild the Russian army. In the 17th century it consisted of local cavalry, semi-regular archery troops and regiments of the "foreign system". The horse noble militia, poorly trained and undisciplined, did not show itself in the best way in clashes with European regular armies. The Swedes and Poles usually defeated him. The fighting efficiency of the archers was higher, but they stained themselves in the eyes of Peter I by participating in riots and political struggle. After the uprising of 1698 and the bloody search, most of the archery regiments were disbanded. “Not warriors, but dirty tricks,” the king said about them. As for the regiments of the "foreign system", under Peter's predecessors they were never able to become a truly regular army, since they borrowed only certain features of the European military order and existed only in wartime. According to a modern historian, it was "a new shoot on an old tree".

The beginning of the formation of a new army. The core of the new regular army was the "amusing" Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky regiments, which were created for the children's and youthful military amusements of Peter, and in 1700 were proclaimed guards. At the same time, according to the new principles, the "elected" soldiers' Butyrsky and Lefortovsky regiments were built, led by the associates of the young tsar P. Gordon and F. Lefort. Among the privileged were also the Streltsy Sukharev and Stremennoy Regiments, who remained loyal to Peter during the rebellion - they also acquired the features of a regular army. During his stay in Europe as part of the Great Embassy, ​​Peter hired big number military specialists who were supposed to rebuild and train the Russian army in a European manner. Abroad bought a lot of modern weapons.

A set of soldiers. At the end of 1699, it was decided to recruit a "direct regular army." Across the country was a set of soldiers from volunteers. The annual 11-ruble salary and the soldier's "bread and fodder" content attracted many poor and "walking" people. (For example, in Saratov, which was then a small outlying town, 800 people wished to enroll in the army.) In addition to the "freemen", the army was forcibly recruited from the peasants. At the same time, there was an accelerated training of officers from the nobility for new soldier regiments. The restructuring of the cavalry into regular dragoon regiments by the beginning of the Northern War was not completed. The cavalry consisted mainly of noble militia. Behind a short time more than 30 thousand people were recruited into the army in addition to the local army, "amusing" and "elected" regiments.

Swedish army. Apparently, the allied countries - Russia, Saxony and Denmark, as well as Poland - together could put up more troops than Sweden, which in the year of Charles XII's accession to the throne had a 60,000-strong standing army. But the Swedish army was perfectly trained, armed and combat-ready, and the Swedish fleet reigned supreme in the Baltic, which made the main territory of Sweden almost invulnerable to opponents. Recall that the plans of the Allies included the reconquest of lands and cities on the southern and eastern shores of the Baltic Sea. Denmark hoped to regain Holstein. The Polish-Saxon king planned to capture the fortress-ports in Livonia. Russia wanted to recapture Ingria and Karelia.

Read also other topics part III ""Concert of Europe": the struggle for political balance" section "West, Russia, East in the battles of the XVII-beginning of the XVIII century":

• 9. "Swedish Deluge": from Breitenfeld to Lützen (September 7, 1631-November 16, 1632)
  • Battle of Breitenfeld. Winter Campaign of Gustavus Adolphus
• 10. Marston Moor and Nasby (July 2, 1644, June 14, 1645)
  • Marston Moor. The victory of the parliamentary army. Cromwell's army reform
• 11. "Dynastic wars" in Europe: the struggle "for the Spanish inheritance" at the beginning of the XVIII century.
  • "Dynastic Wars". The struggle for the Spanish inheritance
• 12. European conflicts take on a global dimension
  • War of the Austrian Succession. Austro-Prussian conflict
  • Frederick II: victories and defeats. Treaty of Hubertusburg
• 13. Russia and the "Swedish question"
  • Russia at the end of the 17th century. An attempt to solve the "Baltic question"
  • Russian army under Peter I
• 14. Battle of Narva

The need for a regular army

The Russian army, created in the course of reform in the conditions of the exhausting Northern War, won numerous victories over a strong enemy. The old armed forces, inherited by Peter from the Muscovite state at the beginning of his reign, were not capable of such tasks, which was clearly demonstrated during the Crimean campaigns, and then by the failure near Narva at the beginning of the war.

The armed forces of the Russian state in the 17th century had a structure that was also characteristic of an earlier time: the noble cavalry, the city (city army) and rural (staff) militia, as well as the archery army that appeared under Ivan the Terrible. The local and settled system of keeping troops, when, after the end of hostilities, the nobles returned to the estates, and the archers and the staff returned to crafts and agriculture, did not contribute to increasing the combat capability of the armed forces.

It was traditional to invite foreigners to the Russian service, and already from late XVI century, this process is greatly enhanced. This made it possible to get to know the Western military orders more closely, to gradually assimilate their positive experience. From the second half of the 17th century, following the model of Western formations, the so-called regiments of a foreign system were created from Russians - on foot and on horseback, whose commanders and officers were foreigners invited to Russian service. The greatest preference for hiring turned out to be the British and the Dutch, because Russia had long-standing trade relations with these countries. But still, most of the troops were local cavalry, armed in a variety of colors and for the most part unsatisfactorily.

Time more and more urgently demanded the creation of a new type of professional armed forces. It was necessary to tear the warrior away from the land or craft, to make military service the only source of his existence.

The beginning of the formation of the regular army

The beginning of the formation of a new type of regular army was laid by four regiments: Lefortov and Gordon, Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky, totaling just over 20 thousand people. Created and trained in accordance with Western standards, they became the backbone and forge of personnel for the new Russian army. After the defeat of the streltsy uprising, these formations were almost the only fighting force on which the tsar could fully rely. Many natives of them later became officers in other units of the regular Russian army.

In the autumn of 1699, the streltsy regiments in Moscow were reformed, and a number of Peter's associates were instructed to form three divisions of nine regiments each, which were recruited from subordinate people from all over the state, as well as from the "eager" people of Moscow. During the winter of 1699/1700, recruits were delivered to Preobrazhenskoye, where Peter personally, with a list in his hands, determined the suitability of each and himself distributed them into regiments, commanded by foreigners who had previously commanded in the regiments of the "foreign system". Officers were appointed either mercenaries who were at the disposal of the Foreign Order, or Semenov and Preobrazhentsy, who had undergone good training in the amusing regiments. There was practically no time to train the newly recruited units (only about three months), which resulted in a crushing defeat near Narva. Peter drew the right conclusions from this defeat. It was decided to proceed more actively with the creation of a new regular army, all the more the situation was favorable, since Charles XII, considering the Russian army completely defeated, turned his main forces against Augustus II.

Since 1699, the principle of recruitment has changed. The recruiting system is gradually being introduced. Militarily, it was progressive for its time, although it placed a heavy burden on the shoulders of the common people. The conditions for the existence of recruits were unbearably harsh, which led to high mortality and mass escapes.

By the end of the first decade of the 18th century, the active field army consisted of 54 infantry regiments (in their including guards - Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky) and 34 cavalry regiments. The borders and cities were guarded by the so-called garrison regiments - 2 dragoon and 40 infantry, which were formed partly from the former regiments of the "foreign system", and partly from archers.

As for the number and distribution of personnel within each branch of the armed forces, the situation has changed over time. The infantry was divided into two types - grenadiers and fusiliers. By 1710, in addition to two guards regiments, 5 grenadiers and 47 fusiliers were formed. After the victory at Poltava, it was decided to have only 42 field infantry regiments: 2 guards, 5 grenadiers and 35 fusiliers. The remaining field regiments were to be disbanded. Regiments changed. Until 1704, the regiment had 10 fusilier companies and only a few - 9 fusilier and 1 grenadier. Since 1704, all regiments had 8 fusilier and 1 grenadier companies. Since 1708, after the unification of all grenadier companies into special regiments, 8 companies remained in the field regiments, reduced to 2 battalions. Only the Semenovsky, Preobrazhensky and Ingermanlandsky regiments had a three-battalion structure (12 companies). According to the states in 1711, the strength of the infantry regiment was 1487 people. According to the states in 1720, the number remained almost the same (1488 people), but the ratio of combatant and non-combatant ranks in the regiment changed somewhat. This situation is typical for the main part of the Russian infantry, if you do not take into account some special formations.

In the cavalry there was a similar process. In 1702, 10 dragoon regiments were formed, in 1705 - the life regiment (the first guards cavalry regiment). According to the states of 1711, it was determined to have 33 dragoon regiments, not counting the life regiment, the staff of which consisted of 10 companies (a total of 1328 people in the regiment). According to the states of 1720, 33 dragoon regiments and the life regiment remained in the cavalry. Among the 33 field regiments, 3 were grenadiers and 30 fueilers. The number of the regiment was 1253 people. In 1721, the life regiment was transformed into an ordinary dragoon regiment.

The first regular part of the artillery was the bombardment company of the Preobrazhensky Regiment. In 1701, a special artillery regiment was formed, consisting of gunnery companies and four bombardment teams, which also had a pontoon and engineer company and assigned ranks. The firm staff of the regiment was determined in 1712. Now it consisted of one bombardier and four gunnery companies, pontoon and engineer teams and regimental ranks. According to the states of 1723, the structure remained the same, but the number of people increased. All artillery was divided into regimental, field and siege artillery. The regimental was part of the field, but was attached directly to the regiments.

At the same time, the unification of weapons of all branches of the armed forces was carried out, a single military uniform was introduced. The transition to linear tactics, which in Russia had specific features, is being completed.

Thanks to such transformations, Peter in a short time managed to create a mobile, well-organized and well-armed regular army. Such a system, despite minor changes, was extremely cumbersome and inconvenient, especially at the level of local territorial administration. All this required the most radical reorganization.

Peter I is without a doubt one of the brightest and most talented statesmen of Russia. The time of his reign fell on the 18th century, and it was under him that Russia finally turned into one of the strongest states in Europe, primarily in military terms.

The topic of the reign of Peter I is very extensive, so we will not touch on all of his many achievements, but will only talk about Peter's reform of the Russian army. The reform involved the creation of a new type of army, more efficient and combat-ready. The further course of events showed that Peter's plans were brilliantly accomplished.

1. What is a regular army and how did it differ from the Russian army of the "old type"?

First of all, we note the difference between the regular (regular) army, which Russia acquired during the reign of Peter the Great, and the army that Russia had before the military reforms.

The Russian army of the old type was in fact a militia, assembled in the event of military necessity. Such an army was completely heterogeneous in composition - it was recruited from among service people, most of whom in peacetime lived on the lands allocated to them by the state for service and were engaged in activities far from military affairs (boyars, stewards, duma clerks, etc. ) This unit, which formed the basis of the Russian army before the reforms of Peter the Great, was distinguished by the absence of constant military training, unified weapons and supplies - each soldier was equipped at his own expense.

Another small part of the old-style army, somewhat reminiscent of the future regular army, was recruited for permanent service and received salaries from the state (gunners, archers, etc.) This part of the army was more combat-ready and trained, but still its training left much to be desired the best.

The numerous difficulties that such an army encountered when faced with well-trained, trained and armed troops like the Swedish, put Russia at an extremely disadvantageous position in the event of a war with such a serious adversary.

What is fundamental difference regular army from the old type army? First of all, the regular army is a standing army.

Such an army does not dissolve in the absence of military necessity, but exists and is in a state of combat readiness even in peacetime.

In the absence of hostilities, she is engaged in military service, training soldiers and officers, maneuvers and is trying in every possible way to strengthen her combat potential.

Such an army has a uniform uniform and weapons, as well as an organization system. The regular army is maintained and supplied by the state.

It is more mobile, better armed and trained, and, accordingly, much better adapted to solve foreign policy problems than the militia. Peter I understood all this very well. It was simply impossible to create one of the strongest states in Europe without the presence of a regular army - and Peter enthusiastically set about solving this problem.

2. Why did Russia need a regular army?

The main foreign policy task of Peter I was to establish control over the Baltic, access to the Baltic Sea, which provided Russia with an advantageous economic and political position.

The main enemy that stood in the way of Russia in this matter was Sweden, which had a strong, well-equipped and trained regular army. In order to defeat the Swedes, gain a foothold in the Baltic and finally resolve the issue of control over the Baltic Sea in its favor, Russia needed an army that was not inferior to the Swedish one.

Peter diligently, step by step, moved in the direction of reforming the troops.

He drew conclusions from the severe defeat of the Russian army near Narva in 1700, after which he consistently strengthened the combat capability of the Russian army. Gradually, the Russian military forces in terms of order, training and organization not only reached the level of the Swedish army, but also surpassed it.

The Battle of Poltava in 1709 marked the rebirth of the Russian army. Competent tactical actions of the new Russian regular army became one of the significant reasons for the victory over the Swedish troops.

3. How was the regular Russian army created?

First of all, Peter I changed the order of recruitment of troops. Now the army was manned by the so-called recruiting kits. A census was made of all peasant households and the number of recruits was determined - soldiers who were to be put up by the yards to replenish the Russian army.

Depending on the needs of the army for soldiers, on a certain number of yards in different time could take different number recruits. During active hostilities, more recruits could be recruited from the yards, respectively, in the absence of an urgent need for people, fewer recruits. Recruitment sets were held annually. Peasants who left in this way as soldiers received liberation from serfdom.

However, it was not enough to recruit soldiers and form an army - it had to be trained.

To do this, Peter I began to hire military specialists from Europe for a lot of money, as well as to train his own officer cadres. Military schools were opened - artillery, engineering, navigation. Commanders were trained on the basis of the best regiments of the Russian land army - Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky. in 1716, a military charter was created that determined the procedure for military service.

A well-trained and prepared army required a good rear and supply.

This task was also brilliantly solved by Peter. As a result of the transformation of the control system, Provisional, Artillery, Naval orders, etc. appeared. This is not about orders - these "orders" were institutions that were engaged in supplying the army and were responsible for a certain area.

All these measures made it possible to radically transform the Russian army, which literally in 15 years turned from a "cathedral" army into a modern, well-organized and armed army, with trained soldiers and officers.

Now the Russian troops were in no way inferior to the European armies. Peter did a really grandiose job - without the creation of a regular army, the transformation of Russia into a great power that has weight in Europe would be impossible.

18th century, History and politics

Creation of a regular army under Peter I

Recruit kits

Peter did not see the defeat of his army - he was no longer in the camp under the walls of Narva: literally on the eve of the battle, he left for Novgorod, taking with him his favorite Aleksashka Menshikov and the commander-in-chief of the army, Field Marshal F.

A. Golovina.

Of course, the fact that the tsar abandoned the army on the eve of the decisive battle does not adorn the great commander. But this act was not evidence of cowardice or weakness. It manifested the rigid rationalism inherent in Peter, the sober recognition of the impending inevitable defeat, the desire to survive in order to continue the struggle with redoubled energy.

Subsequently, many years after the Battle of Narva, Peter, filling out his famous "Journal, or Day Note", came to the idea not only of the inevitability then, in 1700, of defeat, the laws of this shame, but even of the undoubted benefit that brought the ill-fated Narva to the whole business begun.

Of course, the thought of the benefits of defeat at the initial stage of the war, far from the vital centers of the country, came later, and in the first days after the “Narva embarrassment” he thought about something else: how to save what was left and not succumb to panic and despair, for indeed the victory of the Swedes was then "sadly sensual" for Peter.

Internal affairs were more serious: after Narva, Peter clearly realized that the Russian army was not ready to fight its enemy, the Swedish army of Charles XII.

Naturally, the question arises: why was it necessary to reform the army after Narva?

The fact is that the defeat near Narva was on a par with the defeats that pursued the Russian army in the second half of the 17th century. And Peter clearly understood this.

Peter understood the reason for the chronic defeats of the army, he saw that it was necessary to change the very basis on which the military organization depended.

At their core, the regiments of the "new-mannered system" were a kind of local army, a new shoot on an old tree. The officers and soldiers of the "new-mannered" regiments served "from the ground", enjoyed local rights, that is, they were landlords.

Peter had no doubts which way to go.

It was precisely in the absence of an “instruction” - a clear organization, “regularity” (a concept that encompasses and expresses the meaning and purpose of the army reform) - that Peter saw the reason for the failures of the Russian army in the 17th century, as well as near Narva.

It should be noted that he embarked on the path of "regularity" long before the war with the Swedes. As you know, in 1687, 15-year-old Peter created two "amusing" regiments - Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky (after the name of the palace villages where they were located), in which noble children and royal servants served.

Without a doubt, for Peter and his associates, service in the “amusing” became that invaluable military school that gave the young tsar an initial military education and developed those natural gifts that made him an outstanding commander, a reformer of military affairs.

According to the methods and techniques of training, the "amusing" regiments, based on the "regular", that is, not on the local 6az, became the prototype of the army that Peter began to create on the eve and especially in the initial period of the war with Sweden.

The signal for the creation of regular regiments as the main ones was the dissolution of the archery regiments in 1699 after the suppression of their rebellion in 1698.

In the decrees of Peter and other government decrees for 1699, a whole program of creating a new army on principles that are significantly different from those on which the army of the 17th century was built is clearly traced.

For the formation of new regiments, two methods were chosen: the admission of those who wished - volunteers - as they said then, into the “freemen”, as well as the recruitment of “subsistence”.

Everyone who wished was accepted into the “freedom”, except for the peasants who pulled the tax, that is, those who paid state taxes. Among the freemen could be, according to the decrees of the tsar, “boyar children, and from undergrowths, and Cossack, and archery children, and brothers, and nephews, and backbones, and from all sorts of other ranks, and from hired working people who go on ships , besides the retired Moscow regiments of archers, and from arable land you can’t have hard-working peasants at all.

“Datochnye” are basically those armed serfs who, together with their landowners, previously went to a review or war in accordance with the established proportions, for example, the landowner had to put at least one armed soldier from every twenty yards of his estate.

Now the set of free and "subsistence" (this is actually a habitual practice for the 17th century) has acquired a different character, having been radically changed: volunteers were not defined in the soldiers' regiments of the old, local type, and "subsistence" no longer served, as before, in auxiliary troops - they all became the "correct" soldiers of regular regiments.

They were trained according to new charters and kept at the expense of the state, and they became lifelong servicemen who were not allowed to go home after the war.

Since 1705, the government takes the next step - it stops accepting "freemen" and proceeds to recruit the so-called recruits directly from the peasant population, which was not the case before.

This was caused by an acute shortage of people in the army, the needs of which could no longer be met by volunteers and “subsistence allowances”.

The recruiting system was introduced in 1699. It was based on the system of recruiting soldiers and dragoon regiments, which was established in the second half of the 17th century. The merit of Peter I was that, having discarded all other methods of recruitment, he used domestic experience, which justified itself in practice.

With this method of manning, the class principle of organizing the army was firmly fixed. The soldiers were recruited from peasants and other taxable classes, and the officers from the nobility.

All those who signed up were given a salary of 11 rubles a year and fodder money on a par with the Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments. The record of the freemen was entrusted to a special commission. After checking all the data with the census books, the commission decided to collect data from among the landlord peasants and courtyards. It was proposed to recruit into the service only from boyar children, undergrowths of Cossacks and archers and free people.

Later, it was allowed to recruit from data-bearing people, except "from the arable land of fugitive peasants."

The end of recruitment was envisaged in Moscow by December 1, 1699, and in Nizhny Novgorod and low-lying cities - by January 25, 1700.

All those who wished to enlist in the soldiers were offered to be received at the congress yards "without any delay and bribes."

As a result of the activities of both commissions, 22,514 people were accepted into the new instrument soldiers of the Golovin commissions, of which 10,727 people were subordinate and 11,787 free people, and 10,720 people were in the Repnin commission. A total of 33,234 people. Of this number, 32,130 people were sent to the army, and 1,104 people to the navy.

From this contingent, 27 newly-equipped soldier regiments were completed.

Of these: 8 - in Moscow, 9 - in Novgorod and 10 - in low-lying cities. In addition to the infantry regiments, at that time two dragoon regiments were formed, staffed by boyar and noble children who came to military service with their deputies.

Thus, the beginning of the recruitment system was laid by the decree of 1699, but the decree did not resolve all the organizational issues that arose during the recruitment.

The decree outlined only the general features of the recruiting system. Subsequent decrees, supplementing the law of 1699, completed the design of the recruiting system, which finally took shape only by 1705, when a unified basis for recruiting field troops was developed. The garrison troops continued to be completed in the same way.

The collection of recruits was usually carried out by the Local Order through the so-called stations.

Upon receipt of the decree, people were gathered at the stations according to the census books, here “parties” (teams) of 500-1000 people were recruited from them, they were sworn in and forced to give the so-called “entrusted records” so that the recruits would not run away.

After that, the recruiting teams were transferred to the Military Order, which sent them to the regiments.

In order to clarify the contingent of service people who were supposed to do military service as privates, at the end of 1699, their composition was checked, as a result of which underage people aged 15 and above were enrolled in the service.

The ongoing war required continuous reinforcements.

In this regard, in 1703 a number of decrees were issued. So, on July 31, 1703, it was proposed to submit personal lists of all undergrowths to Moscow, and on October 1, it was ordered to send them to military service.

After the registration, all undergrowths who had not previously been at the review were ordered to appear for determination in the dragoon regiments.

The lack of soldiers forced Peter to issue a decree in 1704 on the collection of previously released Moscow archers and archer children in Smolensk and recording them in the field and garrison regiments.

The need to resupply the infantry, which suffered heavy losses during the war, forced the decision to collect from the Moscow Yamsky urban settlements from two yards one person at a time.

To replenish the personnel of the fleet, a recruitment was carried out, which gave 1000 sailors.

The transition to a unified recruiting system could not be carried out without a firm account of the people who were to be enrolled in military service. The government decided to first carry out such registration in the Moscow district. The decree of August 17, 1704 on the general census was intended primarily to solve this problem and, in addition, to streamline the flow of funds for the maintenance of the army. However, this was not possible.

The complexity of the task undertaken caused the census to be temporarily stopped. Despite the lack of accurate data on the number of peasants, the government continued to carry out conscriptions.

In this decree, which requires sending one person at the age of 20 from every 20 households to the soldiers, the word “recruit” is mentioned for the first time, in which a certain content was invested. The decree was accompanied by articles given to the stolniks on the collection of temporary soldiers or recruits.

In 18 articles, the basic principles of the recruiting system were outlined. Particularly important was the 12th article, which said, “out of all the subordinates, at the stations or in his sovereign service, who will die or be killed, or run away, and instead of those, have soldiers from the same people from whom they will be taken, so that those soldiers are always in full and for his sovereign service for any readiness.

It was supposed to create in this way permanent recruitment areas. However, this system created uneven replenishment conditions. That is why this order of recruitment did not last for a relatively long time, and then the tempting system of “immortal recruits” had to be abandoned altogether and proceeded to conduct widespread recruitment according to special decrees. The recruitment of 1705 was somewhat delayed and was extended until September. Thus, a single acquisition system was established from this set.

Subsequent sets were still carried out by the Local Order.

The uneven enrollment had a particularly hard effect on the new provinces, which had to be liberated from enrollment. The government shifted enrollment to the rest of the provinces and offered to be guided by the census books of 1678, and not the data of 1710.

Since 1711, the sets were carried out according to the outfits of the Senate.

Several sets were held in 1711. Special sets were held among clerks, coachmen and monastic servants and courtyard people. According to the first set, 4200 people were taken. And the next two sets gave 47,712 people. In the same year, the government tried to create a reserve of recruits. The decree of 1711 clearly expresses this idea: “for the current real military case, collect again 25 thousand recruits from all provinces in the reserve; Yes, 7 thousand horses in the dragoon service. The decree was confirmed in 1712, and it also determined the norms for reserve in the provinces: "recruits should be taken without any delay, so that in each province there would be a recruit in reserve against the regiments laid in the provinces in the floors."

The number of spares was to be half the sets in the field army.

It was proposed to keep recruits at stations in the Moscow, Siberian, Kiev, Azov, Smolensk, Kazan and Arkhangelsk provinces and "train them in the military article, so that they would be in any readiness for service."

But in 1713, recruiting under this decree was suspended, again it was decided to recruit regiments from all over the state.

Since 1724, the recruitment was carried out not house-to-house, but heart-to-heart. The transition to such a system became possible at the end of the first revision, completed in 1721.

Sets fell heavily on the serfs and state peasants.

The army absorbed the best elements of the village.

Flights were the main form of protest against lifelong military service.

Escapes of recruits took place in subsequent years. The government resorted to the most severe measures. Military courts sentenced runaway recruits to be whipped, exiled to hard labor, and even to death.

So, in 1701, Peter ordered runaway recruits to be hanged by lot or exiled to hard labor. In 1702, he wrote to the boyar T. Streshnev: “When you receive this letter, please immediately find these damned fugitives ... find them all, beat them with a whip and cut their ears, and on top of that, exile them to Taganrog on the 5th from the lot ... "

Decrees on severe punishments for fugitives were issued almost annually.

However, harsh measures did not lead to the desired results. The escapes continued. The worried government decided to investigate the causes of the mass flight.

A special investigation conducted in 1710 showed that the recruits were terrified by the prospect of lifelong service and the inhumane treatment they received during recruitment. At the direction of the government, attention was drawn to best content recruits and somewhat lightened the duties of the population.

At the end of 1712, the government announced that recruiting conditions would be improved and took over the supply of recruits along the way.

While improving recruitment conditions, the government at the same time gave instructions to strengthen the supervision of recruits.

In an effort to improve the situation of recruits, the government for a number of years issued decrees on the forgiveness of the fugitives and on their voluntary appearance.

The returning fugitives were not hanged, but were sent to Azov, Siberia or Petersburg to serve their service. All cases of fugitive recruits were in charge of a special court at the Military Collegium, which was called the Lower Military Court.

Summing up the recruitment of the Russian army in the first quarter of the 18th century, the following should be noted:

The recruiting system significantly changed the face of the Russian army.

In the class army, soldiers were recruited mainly from serfs and state peasants, and officers were recruited from the nobility.

Recruits were taken for life service. After taking the oath, they ceased to be serfs themselves, as well as their children. This, of course, was not universal military service, as noble military historians tried to portray the recruiting system, because the whole burden of recruitment fell on the peasants. The clergy were exempted from military service, and the merchants were paid off and thereby introduced elements of bourgeois relations into the recruitment of troops.

Already at the beginning of the century, the attitude of the government to the issue of recruitment was determined.

It considered the recruitment duty in relation to the peasants not as personal, but as zemstvo or communal. legal entity the government considered "yards", and later "taxable souls", united in a community. Having presented the requirement to supply a certain number of recruits, the government did not care about how the community organizes the selection and in what order the recruits will be distributed among families.

In the communities, a system of order of families in the supply of recruits has developed.

These spontaneously formed rules of the "Russian recruitment" were then used by the ruling circles in their own interests. The landowners turned the community (the world) into an instrument of influencing the peasants, allowing them to be kept in check. In the army, the communal principle was also used in the interests of the ruling classes. He allowed to unite soldiers in artels and oblige them with mutual responsibility.

At the same time, such a selection system played a significant role in strengthening the camaraderie among the soldiers, who looked at their unit as "peace", which increased the moral stamina of the troops.

During the first quarter of the century, the forms of troop mobilization were completely determined.

The collection of recruits took place in the provinces and provinces, and from the 20s the regiments received their own districts and were replenished on a territorial basis. Beginning in 1716, each regiment sent officers to a special team to deliver their recruits. Then the recruits went directly to the regimental commanders, who distributed them as they saw fit. Recruitment made it possible to significantly increase the size of the army and make it combat-ready.

The constant replenishment of the army with untrained recruits created many difficulties: every year the field army had to be trained in the basics of military service.

Recruit(from fr. récruter - to recruit an army) - a person accepted for military service by military service or hire.

• 1. History
• 2 Recruit regiments
• 3 Recruitment
• 4 Recruiting families
• 5 Schools
• 6 Famous recruits
• 7 In other countries
• 8 See
• 9 Literature

Story

Main article: Recruitment duty

In the Russian army and navy (Armed forces) from 1705 to 1874 - a person enrolled in the armed forces on a recruiting duty, to which all taxable estates (peasants, philistines, etc.) were subject and for whom it was communal and lifelong and they supplied a certain number of recruits from their communities (soldier). The recruitment of serfs into the armed forces freed them from serfdom.

The nobility was exempted from recruitment duty. Later, this exemption was extended to merchants, families of clergymen, honorary citizens, residents of Bessarabia and some remote regions of Siberia.

From 1793, indefinite service was limited to 25 years, from 1834 to 20 years, followed by a stay on the so-called indefinite leave for 5 years. In 1855 - 1872, 12-, 10- and 7-year terms of service were successively established and, accordingly, vacations of 3, 5 and 8 years.

Recruitment kits were not produced regularly, but as needed and in various quantities.

Only in 1831, annual recruitments were introduced, which were divided into ordinary ones: 5-7 recruits per 1,000 souls, reinforced - 7-10 people and emergency - over 10. In 1874, after the start of the military reform of Alexander II, recruitment duty was replaced by universal conscription, and the word "recruit" is replaced by the word "rookie". in the USSR and modern Russia to persons subject to service and called for service, the term "conscript" is applied.

Recruit regiments

After the introduction of the recruiting system for manning the armed forces, all regiments were divided into field and garrison regiments.

The garrison regiments were training, and for the replenishment of field units - reserve.

Peter I developed a system in which each recruit had to go through field regiments, garrison regiments (since 1764, garrison battalions), service in civilian departments (watchman, messenger, since 1764 in a disabled team), settlement, dismissal for his own maintenance, or to a monastery, an almshouse.

The purpose of the recruitment system is the fullest possible use of the human resource.

Recruitment set

A nominal decree on the recruitment of recruits was issued in the 18th century in September-October (less often in July-August), in the 19th century - in 30-ser. 40s (July), 1844-1855 - different times (most often July-August-September), 1862-1873. - mostly October-November. The recruitment was to be completed within 2 months.

Recruits had to be at least two arshins and two inches tall (155 cm), healthy and not crippled.

Each recruit had to carry clothes, shoes and food. The delivery of recruits to the place of service was provided by "trappers": Cossacks allocated by the voivodeship office, and soldier teams.

According to the norms of 1766, two old soldiers were supposed to be for 10 recruits, for 20 recruits - one non-commissioned officer and for 50 recruits - one chief officer.

It was supposed to move to the place of service by "direct paths"; in good weather it was supposed to pass 20-30 miles. In bad weather, crossings were cut in half. Every third day was set aside for rest. Roll call was held twice a day. To prevent escapes, the Senate in 1738 introduced the practice of cutting foreheads at county recruitment points.

Upon arrival, a medical examination was carried out. Up to 10% of the recruits were not fit for service due to illness or young age (there are known cases of recruiting 14-year-olds).

Before being assigned to regiments, recruits were read weekly military articles, daily they were taught drill and rifle techniques. In the barracks, it was ordered "not to lose money and provisions in granules and not to drink."

A caricature of the recruiting institute.

recruit families

As a rule, singles were recruited, but the wives of the recruits were allowed to follow their husband to the place of service.

During the service, a soldier could marry with the permission of the regimental authorities. In 1798, 29% of the soldiers in the Irkutsk garrison regiment had families. Soldiers' children from 2 to 6 years old received state support.

Schools

When the regiments existed at first digital, and in 1732 regimental or garrison schools. Boys began their education at the age of 7, and orphans earlier, as they did not have the means of subsistence.

After entering the school, state support was terminated, and salaries were paid instead. In 1731 in the first year - 1 ruble 35 kopecks; after teaching writing, singing, arithmetic, music, plumbing and clerical work, the salary increased to 1 ruble 59 kopecks per year. After learning geometry and fortification, the salary increased to 2 rubles 7 kopecks per year. In addition, every month a schoolboy was supposed to have two quarters of flour (two pounds), 1/8 of a quarter of cereals, and 2 pounds of salt.

Once every three years, a uniform, a sheepskin coat, trousers, and a hat were issued. Every year, matter was released for ties, two shirts, two ports, two pairs of shoes with buckles and stockings. Pupils of the third grade were given a red cloth on the collar to the caftan.

By decree of September 3, 1736, the education of soldiers' children became compulsory. Those who evaded were subject to a fine of 100 rubles. Since 1721, in each garrison regiment, 50 places were created for soldiers' children in digital schools.

By decree of September 2, 1732, 8 student places per company and 64 places per regiment were supposed. From July 1735, supernumerary students were allowed to be admitted. In 1744, digital schools were merged with garrison schools, and everyone was allowed to study in them at their own expense.

Soldiers' children entered the service from the age of 15. Those fit for height and age were sent to the regiments, the rest were determined by clerks, apprentices of locksmiths and blacksmiths, to non-combatant ranks.

In 1805, all the children of soldiers were given the title of cantonists.

Famous Recruits

• Dostoevsky, Fyodor Mikhailovich
• Shevchenko, Taras Grigorievich

In other countries

IN armed forces In some other states, recruits are called recruits with the lowest military rank (eng.

Recruit means literally "recruited", "recruited" - that is, a person who has already been accepted into the service, but has not yet received even basic training).

see also

• Military rank
• Table of ranks
• recruit army
• Military duty
• conscript
• Recruiting Sergeant (English Burletta)

Literature

• Bloodless L. G. " Russian army and navy in the 18th century.

  Moscow, 1958

• Bykonya G. F. “Cossacks and other service population Eastern Siberia in XVIII - early XIX century. Demographic-estate aspect”. Publishing house Krasnoyarsk ped.

  university. V. P. Astafieva. Krasnoyarsk, 2008. ISBN 978-5-85981-287-5

• Hiring a recruit in the middle of the 19th century in the Arkhangelsk province. Arkhangelsk, 1912 (Electronic copy of the book)

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